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BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
CALVIN GROTEPAS, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Case No. 930311-CA 
Priority Classification No. 2 
I. 
JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Sections 78-2a-3(2)(d)&(f). 
II. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
a. 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR BY 
FAILING TO ENTER A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL AS A 
MATTER OF LAW? 
WAS THE CONVICTION OF DEFENDANT THE PROXIMATE 
RESULT OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for ineffective assistance of counsel 
is set forth in the case of Fernandez v. Cook, 217 U.A.R. 3, 4 (Ut. 
1993) wherein the Court stated that ineffective assistance of 
counsel was a mixed question of law and fact. With regard to the 
legal issues the Appellate court is free to make it's own 
independent determination. Factual issues are resolved in favor of 
the trial court unless "clearly erroneous". When an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim is raised for the first time on appeal 
and the review is confined to the trial court record, the question 
of ineffective assistance of counsel is a matter of law and 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Boyatt, 212 U.A.R. 22, 24 (Utah 
App. 1993) 
The Standard of Review for allegations of plain error by the 
trial court require a finding that: 
1. The error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and 
2. The error was harmful in that it affected the 
substantial rights of the accused. State v. Brown, 201 U.A.R. 4, 
5 (Ut. 1992). 
III. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Section 76-6-206(4) Utah Code Annotated provides in 
relevant part as follows: 
(4) It is a defense to a prosecution under 
this section that the: 
(a) property was open to the public when the 
actor entered or remained; and 
(b) actorfs conduct did not substantially 
interfere with the owner's use of the 
property. 
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 
as edited: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall . . . have the assistance of 
counsel for his defense." 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Defendant was charged with violation of the Salt Lake City 
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trespass ordinance Section 11.36.130 after he re-entered the Salt 
Lake Art Center following a verbal banishment order by the Salt 
Lake Art Center management. Defendant went to trial on April 26, 
1993 before the Honorable Judith S. H. Atherton, Circuit Court 
Commissioner. Defendant was found guilty by the court. This 
appeal ensued. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In early 1993 Defendant was enrolled at the Salt Lake Art 
Center school. (Tr.5:15). 
2. On or about March 23rd the Director of the Salt Lake Art 
Center indicated to Defendant that the Art Center school did not 
intend to accept Defendant as a student in the future. (Tr.5:23). 
3. On or about April 1, 1993 Defendant approached the Art 
Center building. (Tr.8:9-25). 
4. The Art Center personnel, including County security, were 
standing near the front door of the Art Center when Defendant 
approached. (Tr.8:24). 
5. Defendant asked the security officer if he (the Security 
Officer) was going to barr him (Mr. Grotepas) from entering the 
premises. (Tr.8:25). 
6. The Security Officer responded no to the question of 
whether he would barr Defendant's entry. (Tr.9:l-5). 
7. Mr. Grotepas entered the premises and was arrested by the 
Security Officer. (Tr.9:4-5). 
8. Apparently, Mr. Grotepas had committed some infractions 
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of Salt Lake Art Center's policies. (Tr.12:4-17). 
9. Defendant had paid his fees for the art class he desired 
to attend. (Tr.25:23-25, Tr.30:6). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court committed plain error when it failed to 
enter a Judgment of Acquittal pursuant to Section 76-6-206(4). 
2. This conviction was the proximate result of the failure 
of Defendant's trial counsel to apprise the trial court of the 
defense contained within Section 76-6-206(4) Utah Code Annotated. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT FAILED 
TO ENTER A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL PURSUANT 
TO SECTION 76-6-206(4) 
Section 76-6-206(4) Utah Code Annotated provides in relevant 
part as follows: 
(4) It is a defense to a prosecution under 
this section that the: 
(a) property was open to the public when the 
actor entered or remained; and 
(b) actor's conduct did not substantially 
interfere with the owner's use of the 
property. 
The above statute requires that the Court find two facts in 
order for the defense to defeat a prosecution. The relevant facts 
are first, that the property was open to the public and second, 
that the actor did not substantially interfere with the owner's use 
of the property. 
The evidence adduced at trial indicates that the Salt Lake Art 
Center runs an art type school which is open to the public. 
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Further, the Appellant did not engage in any conduct which 
interfered in any way with the owner's use of the building where 
the Art Center is situated. The evidence showed that the only 
thing that Mr. Grotepas did was attempt to enter the Art Center 
despite the request by the Art Center personnel that he not enter. 
The record discloses that the officer who accompanied the Art 
Center officials who had asked Mr. Grotepas not to return to the 
building stepped aside and allowed Mr. Grotepas to enter the 
building (R9:l-4). 
Under State v. Brown, 201 U.A.R. 4 (Ut. 1992) in order for the 
Defendant to prevail on a claim of plain error the Defendant must 
demonstrate: 
1. That the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; 
2. The error was harmful in that it affected the substantial 
rights of the accused. 
The defense contained in Section 76-6-206(4) Utah Code 
Annotated provided a clear defense to the allegation of criminal 
trespass. Defendant asserts that the trial court should have had 
a rudimentary understanding of the State trespassing statute. The 
failure of the trial counsel or the trial court to rely on the 
statutory defense appears harmful in that it was the cause of 
Defendant's conviction. 
Point II. 
THE CONVICTION ENTERED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS THE 
RESULT OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
A review of the record discloses that Appellant's trial 
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counsel never informed the Court of or raised in any way the 
defense set forth in 76-2-206(4) Utah Code Annotated. To establish 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show, 
first, "that counsel rendered deficient performance that fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that counsel's 
deficient performance prejudiced defendant." State v. Villarreal, 
218 U.A.R. 29, 30 (Ut. App. 1993). Citing State v. Humphries, 818 
P.2d 1027, 1029 (Ut. 1991). 
While a defendant cannot normally raise issues on appeal which 
were not raised before the trial court, "An appellant, however, can 
raise such a claim [ineffective assistance of counsel] if the trial 
record is adequate to permit determination of the issue and there 
is new counsel on appeal." Villarreal at 30. As to the first 
prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, it appears 
clear that trial counsel should have at the minimum reviewed the 
State trespass statute to see if it was applicable to the facts at 
trial. The second part of the analysis involves an inquiry as to 
whether the trial counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the 
defendant. In short, the question is whether there would be a 
reasonable probability of a different result had counsel acted 
differently. 
A review of the trial transcript indicates that the premises 
were open to the public. Furthermore, the trial transcript 
indicates that Defendant did not proceed in a confrontational 
manner and was in fact quite civil to the Arts Center personnel. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court should have entered a verdict of not guilty as 
a matter of law. Defendant's trial counsel should have raised the 
statutory trespass defense in this matter. Failure to raise the 
statutory defense resulted in Defendant's conviction. 
WHEREFORE, Appellant prays for the following relief: 
1. For an Order adjudicating Defendant not guilty of the 
charged offense; or in the alternative, 
2. For an Order remanding this matter to the trial court for 
such Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as may be appropriate 
with regard to the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Respectfully submitted this & day of October, 1993. 
ROBERT BREEZE 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify I mailed/hand delivered a copy of the foregoing to: 
Cheryl Luke 
Salt Lake City Prosecutor 
451 South 200 East, First Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Cal Grotespas 
714 North 900 West #201 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
on this ^ day of October, 1993. 
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ADDENDUM 
1136.120 
b. Recklessly causes or threatens a substantial 
impairment of any public utility service; or 
2. He or she intentionally damages, defaces or 
destroys the property of another; 
3. He or she recklessly or wilfully shoots or 
propels a missile or other object at or against a 
motor vehicle; horse or carriage, operating under 
the provisions of Chapter 5.37 of this code, or its 
successor; bus; airplane; boat; locomotive; train; 
railway car or caboose; whether moving or stand-
ing. 
B. Violation of this section is a Class B misde-
meanor if the actor's conduct causes or is intended 
to cause pecuniary loss in excess of two hundred 
fifty dollars, and is a Class C misdemeanor if the 
actor's conduct causes or is intended to cause loss 
of less than two hundred fifty dollars. (Ord. 52-89 
§ 4,1989; Ord. 88-86 § 60 (part), 1986: prior code 
§32-3-5) 
1136.130 Trespass by persons and motor 
vehicles. 
A. 'l^j^SSidaWWpSim^ take down 
any fence, or to let down any bars, or to open any 
gate so as to expose any enclosure, or to ride, drive, 
waffli lodge, or camp or sleep uponlEe premisls 
of amotirerwithout the permission of the^bwner 3r 
.occupant thereof, <?r to rem^^pon'sucirpfejil 
ises after the j ^ m u s s l o i ^ 
B. It is unlawful for any person to drive or park 
any motor vehicle, motorcycle or motor-driven 
cycle upon any city-owned property not desig-
nated for vehicular traffic or parking without per-
mission of the mayor of the city or his or her 
designated appointee. 
C It is unlawful for any person to operate any 
type of motor vehicle (including but not limited to 
motorcycles, trail bikes, dune buggies, 
motorscooters or jeeps) upon the private property 
of another, without first obtaining the written per-
mission of the person in lawful possession of the 
property or, if the property is unoccupied, the 
owner of such property. 
D. It is unlawful for any person to operate any 
type of motor vehicle (including but not limited to 
motorcycles, trail bikes, dune buggies, 
motorscooters or jeeps) upon any public property, 
except designated streets, highways or alleys, with-
out first obtaining the written permission of the 
public entity which is in possession of such prop-
erty or, if the property is unoccupied, the public 
entity which owns such property. 
E. Every person who operates any type of 
motor vehicle upon the private property of an-
other or upon any public property, except as here-
inabove provided, at all times while so operating 
such motor vehicle shall maintain in his or her 
possession the written permission required by the 
two preceding subsections, except that, if the same 
document grants permission to two or more per-
sons, a person named in such document need not 
have it in his or her possession while another 
person named in the same document, riding in the 
same group and not more than three hundred feet 
from such person, has such document in his or her 
possession. 
F. This section does not prohibit the use of 
such property by the following: 
1. Emergency vehicles; 
2. Vehicles of commerce in the course of nor-
mal business operations; 
3. Vehicles being operated on property de-
voted to commercial or industrial purposes where 
such operation is in conjunction with commercial 
or industrial use and permission for such opera-
tion is implied or expressly given by the person in 
possession of said property; 
4. Vehicles operated on property actually used 
for residential purposes, where such vehicles are 
there at the express or implied invitation of the 
owner or occupant; 
5. Vehicles being operated on public or private 
parking lots, where permission to do so is implied 
or expressly given by the person in possession of 
such lot. 
397 (Stlt Ukc City 8-90) 
1136.130 
G. Violation of this section shall be punishable 
as follows: 
1. Trespass in a dwelling shall constitute a 
Class B misdemeanor violation. 
2. Entering or remaining upon property, other 
than a dwelling, where such trespass would cause 
injury or property damage, shall be a Class C 
misdemeanor. 
3. Trespass, other than a dwelling, where no 
damage or injury occurs, is an infraction. (Ord. 
88-86 § 60 (part), 1986: prior code § 32-3-3) 
1136.140 Placing printed matter on 
vehicles. 
A. It is unlawful for any person to distribute, 
deposit, place, throw, scatter or cast, or cause to 
be distributed, deposited, placed, thrown, scat-
tered or cast, any handbill, circular, card, booklet, 
placard or other printed or written matter of any 
type, except notice of parking violations together 
with an envelope for the payment thereof, in or 
upon any automobile or other vehicle. 
B. The provisions of this section shall not be 
deemed to prohibit the handing, transmitting or 
distributing of any noncommercial printed or writ-
ten matter to the owner or other occupant of any 
automobile or other vehicle who is willing to ac-
cept the same. (Prior code § 32-3-9) 
1136.150 Expectoration and spitting in 
public places. 
It is unlawful for any person to expectorate or 
spit, or throw cigar stumps, cigarette stumps or 
quids of tobacco on the floor of any street railway 
car or other public conveyance, or public building, 
or upon any paved sidewalk or paved crosswalk 
within the city. (Prior code § 32-3-7) 
Chapter 11.40 
FRAUDS AND CHEATS 
Sections: 
11.40.020 
11.40.030 
11.40.040 
,11.40.050 
11.40.060 
11.40.070 
Obtaining money or goods 
under false pretenses. 
Cheats and swindlers. 
Using slugs in vending 
machines. 
Slugs or counterfeit coins— 
Manufacture or sale 
prohibited. 
Leaving establishment 
without paying prohibited. 
Selling or receiving articles 
with serial numbers or marks 
removed. 
11.40.020 Obtaining money or goods 
under false pretenses. 
It is unlawful for any person, by false or fraud-
ulent representation or pretense, to obtain from 
another person any chose in action, money, goods, 
wares, merchandise, chattels, effects or other 
valuable thing, with intent to cheat or defraud any 
person of the same, within the limits of the city; 
provided, the value of the property so obtained 
does not exceed one hundred dollars. (Prior code 
§ 32-4-1) 
11.40.030 Cheats and swindlers. 
It is unlawful for any person to engage in or 
practice any game, trick or device with the intent 
to obtain money or other valuable thing from 
others by trick or fraud, or to aid or assist therein. 
(Prior code §32-4-2) 
11.40.040 Using slugs in vending machines. 
It is unlawful for any person to knowingly place 
any token, slug, false or counterfeit coin, or 
(Salt Lake Gty 8-90) 398 
